Dahlia Moore

Gender Identity, Nationalism, and Social Action among Jewish and Arab Women in Israel: Redefining the Social Order?

In the study this article explores, the meaning of gender identity for religious and secular Jewish and Arab women in Israeli society is examined. The study focuses on how Israeli women rank gender identity relative to other identities like being Jewish/Arab, being Israeli/Palestinian, religious or secular, of a certain ethnic group, and political identity. It examines the characteristics of gender identity and the attitudes that are associated with it. The analysis shows that the hierarchies of identities are different for religious and secular Jewish and Arab women, and that this is related to having different sociopolitical attitudes (e.g., Women's social and political involvement, social obedience, social influence). Thus, the hierarchy of identities and the sociopolitical attitudes of religious women indicate a more consensual acceptance of the social order than the hierarchy of identities and the sociopolitical attitudes of secular women, especially among Arab women.

The mass media shows Israeli and Palestinian women participating in the conflict between their societies in many stereotypical ways. Palestinian women in Gaza and the West Bank are shown fighting Israeli soldiers to prevent them from capturing young Palestinians suspected of resisting the occupation. Jewish women-settlers—"Women in Green"—are portrayed as "pioneers" in the occu-

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pied land who fight to continue the occupation, while "Women in Black" are depicted as Israeli women opposing the occupation. Most Palestinian women we see are elderly and dressed as devout Muslims, most of the Jewish settlers are young mothers and appear by their clothing to be orthodox, and most of the women who oppose the occupation are depicted by the media as secular, liberal, "modern" women. These stereotypical representations of women seem to derive from an assumption regarding a significant relationship between religiosity and political ideology among both Israeli and Palestinian societies.

But how are these relationships affected by women's gender identities? Does a salient gender identity lead to greater participation in social action? And if so, does a salient gender identity have different meanings for women who are at the polar ends of the political spectrum? Is religiosity one of the forces shaping the interplay between gender identity and the willingness to participate in social action? And do these relationships exist among the distinct group that is missing from this picture—i.e., the Palestinian women who are citizens of Israel?

This study examines the meaning of gender identity for religious and secular women in Israeli society and the relationship between gender identity and the willingness to participate in social action. It analyzes the existence of salient gender identities in relation to other identities, that when adopted by diverse agents from the larger repertoire, determine large parts of the competing sociopolitical orders as carried, produced and reproduced by these agents. It also examines the socio-political correlates of salient gender identities, and analyzes the demographic characteristics of these women.

The examination of these issues is important for several reasons. First, some studies show that salient gender identities indicate a weakening of collective identities (like the civic or national identities) and a dispute over the existing social order (Abrams and Emller, 1992). Other studies indicate that salient gender identities may also be associated with the opposite trend, i.e., they strengthen collective (patriarchal) ideologies (Moore, 1998 a, b). These diverse relationships may be a by-product of another factor—religiosity—that is examined in the present study. Second, feminist ideologies have begun to spread more swiftly to grassroots levels in Israel only in the past decade, and their impact on the nationalist discourse was not measured extensively in Israel. Third, although the study focuses on Israeli society, its conclusions may be relevant for diverse societies in which gender identity, religion and nationalism interact, and enhance the understanding of the correlates of salient gender identities in other societies, especially in the Middle East.

Theoretical Background

Social Identities

Social identities are created by both societal forces (which define social categories) and individual processes (which define group identification). However, although both processes—social categorization and group identification—often feedback on each other, their interface and interdependence are not inherent. For social categorization to become group identity, individuals who are in one category must not only accept the socially created distinction between them and others, they must also develop a belief in a common destiny for all group members (Hunt, 1980; Tajfel and Turner, 1986).

Thus, to become a valid collective identity—i.e., one that is held by substantial numbers of a real or imaginary collectivity and defines the boundaries and rules of this collectivity—the identity must also be a *personal* identity. These identities are an integral part of the social construction, transformation, and dismantling of collectivities on diverse levels. I assume that every social actor or "agent" (Giddens, 1984) has a relatively limited repertoire of personal or collective social identities, which are constructed by the individual's desire for membership in a specific collectivity and culture.

However, like Giddens' agent in the loop-structure, almost every chosen identity simultaneously determines the relevant collectivity for the individual, and also constitutes, in aggregate form, the collectivity itself. Thus identities, even those possessing different meanings, are the common denominator and societal space of the collectivity, in Giddensian terms, that gives a patterned consistency to the construction of societal boundaries (Cohen, 1987). Most of these identities compete for preferential status within a particular person. As such, identities are a part of an ongoing sociopolitical struggle.

Priority in placing one identity over all others will be determined according to the issue the person deals with (Steeh and Schuman, 1992), or according to the cleavages in the particular society (Marshal et al., 1988). Thus, in societies in which national rights are debated, people's nationalistic components of social identity tend to become salient; in societies where religion is the major basis for social strife, people define themselves in terms of the religious component of their social identity (Devine, 1992). However, a person may have a salient social identity that is *not* related to a divisive issue (e.g., family identity) (Ashforth and Mael, 1989).

The central theoretical assertions upon which this article is based are: (1) Social identities are implanted into agents by the agent's very membership in a collectivity and the traits constructed by a specific culture, that leads it towards specific

social conducts (Giddens, 1994). (2) The agent's flexibility in according salience to social identities, is a major mechanism of the structuration process, or the process of continuous production and reproduction of a social order. The term "social order" means the formation of institutions and organizations that includes the shaping of their "cultural" meaning (Hays, 1994), or the fusion between institutional structure and the accepted rules-of-the-game. Thus, the hierarchy of identities of diverse social agents may indicate the type of social order they support (or reject) and may be, therefore, associated with different value systems (Converse, 1964).

Many social theorists deal with different aspects of social identity, but most of them do not place this societal phenomenon in the larger context of structuration or any other form of the production and reproduction of social order (or the willingness to dispute and actively participate in actions to change the social order). According to Marx, the mobilization of a social category into a social group is a political process of turning a "class in itself" into a "class for itself," and may be achieved from within or outside the collectivity in question. "Outside forces" are the societal institutions which produce and reproduce categorizations (such as ethnicity, race and gender), and the socialization agents instill in individuals in a specific social context (Jenkins, 1996). "Within forces" are the individuals' preferences and identification with specific groups (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1985).

At the individual level, social identities are based on people's tendency to classify themselves and others into diverse social categories (like class, race, ethnic origin, religion, gender, and age groups). This creates the distinction between "in-group" and "out-group" (Ellemers and van Rijswijk, 1997; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Each person belongs to several groups at the same time and may identify with more than one group. For each person, the identities are organized into hierarchies on the basis of their centrality and/or salience for the individual and are basically stable over time (Stryker and Serpe, 1994; Weigert et al., 1990).

The most prevalent identities in Israel, according to Moore (1998a) and Kimmerling and Moore (1997), are the family identity, followed by the Jewish/Arab, Israeli/Palestinian, and the occupational identity. These collective identities represent different aspects of the collectivity for both Jews and Palestinians. The first has territorial and civic connotations; the second is related to broader, primordial loyalties that imply affiliation with the Jewish people in the Diaspora or the Pan-Arab world (also Auron, 1993).

The Gender Identity

Gender identity connotes recognition of differences between the sexes as well as awareness that these differences are societally-directed, leading to differential

treatment of men and women, creating diverse life-experiences, roles, and statuses for members of the two gender groups (Gilligan, 1982; Ollenburger and Moore, 1992). Gender identity is considered one of the primary identities, which are established early in life by the socialization process (like selfhood and human-ness). Primary identities are more robust and resilient to change in later life than other identities. Thus, although change and mutability are endemic in all social identities, they are less likely in these identities (Jenkins, 1996).

Unlike other social identities, gender identity may have two opposing meanings for both the subordinate (women) and dominant (men) groups. On the one hand, gender identity may reflect adherence to the traditional division of labor according to which women's family role is their primary role, and men's breadwinner role is their primary role. This meaning of a salient gender identity indicates support of the existing patriarchal social order. On the other hand, gender identity may reflect espousing of feminist and/or egalitarian ideas and rejection of existing social order and traditional[1] gender roles (Hunt, 1980; Moore, 1998a, b; Wuthrow and Lehrman, 1990).

Most conservative religious ideologies are patriarchal,[2] bestowing upon men higher status and privileges, and often legitimating the subordination of women. They have established different rituals and rules for men and women, and teach that men have the right to tell others (who are women) how to be, what is right for them and what is wrong (Hunsberger, 1995).

It seems logical to assume that support of the traditional division of labor is more prevalent among religious men and women (especially those of the more orthodox denominations of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity). As a result, a salient gender identity among religious individuals may indicate acceptance of the gendered division of labor, preservation of the social order, and resistance of change (El-Or, 1995; Sered, 1987).

Thus, whether Jewish, Muslim, or Christian, most orthodox women with salient tradition-oriented gender identities are expected to support libertarian, egalitarian ideologies less than most secular, nontraditional persons.[3] In countries where state and religion are not separated (like Israel), this 'tradition-oriented gender identity' may be even more prevalent than in societies in which the separation formally exists (like the United States).

For secular, nontraditional persons, a salient gender identity seems to be based on egalitarian and/or feminist notions. According to egalitarian and some of the feminist ideologies, men and women are basically similar and, therefore, have a right to equal status, opportunities, and rewards. Other feminist ideologies emphasize the uniqueness of each gender and the distinct perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of men and women.[4]

Among women, feminist awareness of a "common destiny" is reached not in early childhood when the gender identity is acquired and/or imposed, but later in life when women *experience* what it means to bear the identity and be part of a differentially treated category whose social roles are often in conflict (Kaufman, 1991; Moore and Gobi, 1995).

A "feminist gender identity" can only be prevalent in a society where ideological pluralism exists (ideological pluralism means that no ideological hegemony exists in that society and the emergence of alternative views is not blocked). In ideologically pluralistic societies, different ideologies are espoused by opposing sides, thus providing justification and rationalization for the identities. In this sense, ideology provides direction and motivating force for the identities.

Most Israeli women are aware of their inferior status, especially in the labor market (Moore, 1991) but until recently this awareness was not translated into massive organized social action. This may be explained, in part, by the lack of widespread feminist ideologies that would have defined the gender boundaries and rationalized the conflict until recently.[5] The change may be due to the increase in feminist activity in the Knesset, the establishment of women's studies programs in the universities, and the knowledge about success of programs like affirmative action that is spreading (Izraeli, 1994; Moore, 1998b).

Assumptions and Hypotheses

This study examines whether salient gender identities are related to greater participation in social action and whether salient gender identities have different meanings for Jewish and Palestinian religious and secular women, in order to determine whether religiosity is one of the forces shaping the interplay between gender identity and participation in social action.

The study is based on several assumptions. First, as feminist ideas and ideologies have only recently begun spreading in Israel, it is logical to assume that it reached Jewish women more than Arab ones. A bigger proportion of Arab women lives in far-from-the-center, rural areas than Jewish women. In those areas, the proportion of Arab women who live with extended traditional families ("Hamula") is larger than the proportion of Arab women who live with extended family in cities, so that the hold of religious values on them is stronger than on other women (Haddad, 1985). They are also less independent than other Israeli women are—the control of the family is stronger, fewer among them work outside the home, etc. (El Saadawi, 1980; Mernissi, 1987; Shokeid, 1993). As a result, even when feminist ideas and ideologies reach the villages, they are ineffective in the sense that they cannot break through the genderic barriers (Moghadam, 1992).

The second assumption refers to the relationship between religiosity and gender identities. According to this assumption, for both Jewish and Arab women in Israel being religious means being orthodox (Peres, 1992). Thus, when religious women rank their gender identity as a salient identity, it is logical to assume that they refer to a traditional gender identity according to which "being a woman" means submission to male supremacy and dominance, acceptance of their exclusion from the public sphere, and so forth. When secular women rank their gender identities as a salient identity, it is logical to assume that they refer to a less traditional, basically feminist gender identity. The study must, therefore, first examine the attitudinal correlates of gender identities of religious and secular women.

Three hypotheses were defined to examine these assumptions:

H_1: Gender identities of religious and secular Arab and Jewish women are related to different sociopolitical social orders that reflect the different value systems they embrace.

H_2: Religious women with salient gender identities are less socio-politically active than secular women with salient gender identities.

H_3: The relationships among gender identities, religiosity, and social actions are weaker among Arab women than among Jewish women.

Research Method

The Sample

This study is based on a national probability sample drawn in 1992. The first represents the Jewish population in Israel, excluding kibbutzim (N=1200); the second represents the Arab population in Israel (N=250) excluding Arabs in the occupied territories. (The Israeli population is about 80 percent of all Israeli citizens; the Arab population is close to 20 percent). The respondents' ages range from twenty to seventy years of age.[6] The proportions of ethnic, gender, and geographic location categories in the sample correspond to those of the population from which it was drawn in 1992 (see Central Bureau of Statistics, 1992). The present analysis focuses only on the women in these samples (605 Jewish women and 123 Arab women).

Data were collected within two months by structured interviews conducted by Jewish and Arab interviewers employed by a survey research institute. The questionnaire was in Hebrew for the Jewish sample and in Arabic for the Arab sample. The two questionnaires were basically the same but they were not completely identical. Some cultural and political concessions were made (for example, Jews were

asked about their Jewish identity, Arabs were asked about both their Arab and Palestinian identity; Jews were asked about the major political parties; Arabs, too, were asked about these parties but they were also asked about Arab parties.[7] All interviews were conducted in the respondents' homes, where the interviewer completed the questionnaire together with the respondent. Only one person per household was interviewed.

Measures and Variables

Three types of variables were included: components of social identity, measures of sociopolitical activism, and demographic characteristics.

Components of social identity. Jewish respondents were asked to rank 9 components of social identities; Arab respondents were asked to rank 11 components. Both groups of respondents rated profession, Israeli, family, nationality (Jewish/Arab), locality, political attitudes, ethnicity, [8] religiosity, and gender. Arabs were also asked to rank Palestinian, and type of locality (urban vs. rural). The question asked: "Each person has different things that characterize him. Here is a list of 9 (11) characteristics. Please rank those who characterize you most by order of their importance. Write 1 for the most important characteristic, 2 for the second in importance, and so forth. There is no need to rank characteristics that are not important for you." Because Jews and Arabs were required to rank a different number of identities, the ranking of identities was recoded so that for each identity, the first, second, and third place were combined to indicate a salient identity, and other ranks (or no ranking at all) indicate a weak identity.[9] Table 1 presents the identity components and ranks.

Sociopolitical Activism. The variables in this category represent three distinct but interrelated domains of social activism: (1) rebelliousness, (2) social involvement, and (3) perceived responsibility.

The first domain of social activism, Rebelliousness, is represented by three separate variables: Social obedience measures respondents' beliefs that it is the duty of citizens to obey the laws of the state in all circumstances. Responses ranged from 1 (fully agree) to 4 (totally disagree). Social influence measures whether respondents believe that citizens can influence sociopolitical issues. Responses ranged from 1 (People like me have much influence) to 4 (People like me have no influence at all). Protest measures whether the respondent organized or participated in any kind of protest (demonstrated, participated in an act of protest, or joined an organization). Responses ranged from 1 (Joined or initiated) to 0 (Not at all).

The second domain, Social Involvement, measures actual participation in the social and political sphere. It asked: "In the last 5 years, were you a member in any

TABLE 1
Social Identity Components: Percent of Women who Ranked each Identity in First, Second or Third Place[1]

Jewish/Secular	Jewish/Religious	Arab/Secular	Arab/Religious Social identity Components[2]
22.2	24.1	14.1	Your occupation
48.9	18.9	17.5	Being Israeli
77.1	34.4	32.8	Your family
72.2	58.6	53.1	Being Jewish/Arab[3]
11.3	15.5	15.6	Your locality
3.5	15.5	12.5	Your political attitudes
8.5	25.8	50.0	Your ethnic group[4]
15.1	6.8	14.1	Being religious/secular
16.1	27.6	25.0	Being a man/a woman
	51.7	48.5	Being Palestinian
	3.4	4.7	Being Urban/rural

1. Numbers in the Table are percents of all female respondents in the category.
2. Jews ranked 9 identity components, Arabs ranked 11.
3. Jews were asked about being Jewish, Palestinians were asked about being Arab.
4. For Jews, the distinction is Romanian, Moroccan, Polish, and so forth. For Arabs, the distinction is Muslim, Christian, Druz, and Cherkessian.

of the following (whether an active member or not)?" (1) Apartment house committee; (2) PTA; (3) Community committee; (4) Workers' committee; (5) Labor union; (6) A synagogue; (7) Voluntary organization; (8) Economic organization; (9) A political movement or group (not a party); and (10) Political party. (Answers were 1 = Active member, 2 = inactive member, 3 = not a member, 4 = irrelevant).

A varimax rotated factor analysis using Kaiser's Normalization has shown that there are two major dimensions of sociopolitical activity (see Appendix I). The first, which represents involvement in broadly defined public-sphere organizations (labor union, synagogue, economic, or political organizations), explains 38 percent of the variance (Cronbach $\alpha = .81$). The second dimension, which represents the closer-to-home activity where the person's involvement contributes directly to his or her own life, or his or her family's life, like house and community committee, PTA, etc., explains about 13 percent of the variance.[10] (Cronbach $\alpha = .76$).

Two additional variables are included in this dimension of social activism. The first variable, Attachment to neighborhood, assumes that the more dedicated to the neighborhood a respondent felt, the more likely he or she was to be involved in it.

We expected this measure to be closely related to other measures of social involvement but to reflect a more specific dimension of involvement. The question

asked: "To what extent do you feel attached to your neighborhood?" Response ranged from 1 (Strongly attached) to 5 (not at all). The second variable, Willingness to emigrate, assumes that the more willing to leave the country a person feels, the less attached he/she is likely to be and, therefore, less likely to be socially active.

The third domain of social activism, Perceived responsibility, reflects the individuals' perception of their responsibility for major social and political issues as citizens. The study assumes that the more responsible the individual believes citizens to be, the more liberal and the less collectivistic that individual is likely to be. In addition, the stronger the dependence on state support and responsibility, the less able the individual is to oppose state promulgated values and ideologies. It asked: "For each of the following, should the issue be dealt with by the citizens or by the state?" (1) Building kindergartens and day-care centers; (2) Helping factories that are in financial problems; (3) Absorbing new immigrants; (4) Aiding settlers in new settlements (in far-from-the-center places within the 1948 borders); (5) Aiding settlers in new settlements beyond the 1948 border line (the territories); (6) Supporting the needy (the elderly, battered wives, etc.); (7) Preventing crime; (8) Dealing with those suspected of terrorist actions; and (9) Interfering with groups that attempt to undermine the state. (Answers were 1 = much better if the citizens dealt with it, 3 = dealt with equally by the citizens and the state, and 5 = much better if the state dealt with it).

A varimax rotated factor analysis using Kaiser's Normalization has shown that these issues form three distinct dimensions: 1–security issues (items 7, 8, 9, explaining more than 30 percent of the variance. Cronbach $\alpha = .74$), 2–economic issues (items 2, 4, 5, explaining about 18 percent of the variance. Cronbach $\alpha = .66$), and 3–social support (items 1, 3, 6, explaining about 12 percent of the variance. Cronbach $\alpha = .57$). The analysis (see Appendix II) shows that the state is always expected to shoulder most of the responsibility. However, the responsibility for security is attributed almost totally to the state; economic issues are seen as better dealt with by the state, and the social issues are seen as better dealt with when shared by the government and the citizens.

Political orientation was added as control because of ties with ethnicity and religiosity in Israeli society (Left-wing = 1; else = 0).

Demographic Characteristics

Marital status: Not married = 1, married = 0.

Family size: Continuous, 1–9 (9 includes 9 or more persons in the family).

Religiosity: ultra-orthodox = 1; orthodox = 2; traditional = 3; secular, but observes some of the tradition = 4; secular = 5 anti-religion = 6. The variable was later dichotomized into religious (categories 1–3) = 0, secular (categories 4–6) =1.[11]

Locality—Measures the type of locality. Although interviewers marked specific names, all localities were recoded because most Jews and Arabs live in different localities. Thus, living in a city = 1; living in rural localities = 0.

Education—People were coded into 8 categories: No formal education = 1; 1 to 4 years of formal education = 2; 5 to 8 years = 3; 9 to 10 years = 4; 11 years = 5; 12 years = 6; more than 13 years, nonacademic = 7; academic education = 8.

Employment—The question asked whether the person was employed, whether that employment was in the public or private sector, and reasons for not working (e.g., housewife, student, soldier, unemployed, pension). As the reported differences between Jewish and Arab women refer to employment versus no employment, the responses were coded so that employed = 1 and not employed = 0).

Income level (1 = up to 600 NIS, 9 = over 6,000 NIS)
age (1 = 20–24, 9 = +65).

Analysis Strategy

The study examines the prevalence of gender identity among religious and secular Jewish and Arab women, and the social and attitudinal correlates of these identities. First, it compares the relative salience of gender identity vis-à-vis other identities among these four groups of women, and their spatial relationships. This analysis would determine which identities form the most central components in the identity structures of these women. Second, comparing the correlation matrices, the study examines whether salient gender identities of religious and secular women are related to diverse demographic characteristics and sociopolitical attitudes. Finally, the study analyzes the patterns of sociopolitical attitudes among the four groups.

Results

The hierarchies of identities of the four groups of women—Arab religious, Arab secular, Jewish religious, and Jewish secular—are different. For Jewish women, gender identity is ranked by 23 percent of the secular women in first, second, or third place, and by 16.1 percent of the religious women. This places gender identity as fifth among the nine identities ranked by both secular and religious Jewish women. Among Arab women, gender identity is ranked by 27.6 percent of the secular women as a salient identity, and by 25 percent of the religious women. This places gender identity as fourth among the nine identities ranked by secular women, and as fifth among the identities of religious women.[12] Family is the most salient identity component in the hierarchy of identities of Jewish women (77 percent of the religious women and 78.6 percent of the secular women ranked family identity in first, second, or third place, see Table 1). For religious Jewish women, the national identity (being Jewish) comes a close second (ranked by 72.2 percent as a salient identity),

and is followed by the civic identity (being Israeli, ranked by 48.9 percent as a salient identity). For secular women the order is reversed and the civic (being Israeli, ranked by 65.1 percent as a salient identity) identity precedes the national identity (being Jewish, ranked by 50.3 percent as a salient identity).

For Arab women, collectivistic identities precede family identity among both religious and secular women. Among the religious women, national identity (being Arab, ranked by 53.1 percent as a salient identity), ethnic identity (ranked by 50.0 percent of the respondents as a salient identity), and the civic identity (being Palestinian, ranked by 48.5 percent of the respondents as a salient identity) precede family identity. For secular Arab women, both civic and national identities precede the family identity (ranked by 58.6 percent and 51.7 percent, respectively, as a salient identity), but not ethnic identity (ranked only by 25.8 percent as a salient identity).

In summation, the hierarchy of identities seems more consensual among Jewish women where a majority of the women ranked the same three identities as salient (though the rank order seems to represent different social orders). For Arab women, there is lower consensus and the salient identities represent more varied hierarchies. These findings may also indicate that for Jewish women, family identity has a different role in the hierarchy of identities of the two groups. According to Moore and Kimmerling (1995), there are several strategies of constructing hierarchies of identities. The adoption of one strategy over others is closely related to the individual's location in the stratification structure and her corresponding worldview. It seems that whereas family identity derives from and strengthens the Jewish identity among religious women (being Jewish means, in part, an emphasis on family values and ties), it moderates and weakens the demands made on the individual by the collectivistic identity among the secular women.

These conclusions are strengthened by the examination of the spatial relationships represented by the proximities-based models. Figures 1 to 4 represent the distances between these components in a two-dimensional Euclidean distance model. Dimension 1 may be interpreted as indicating a substantive individualism-collectivism continuum (with the left-hand corner representing individualism and the right-hand corner representing collectivism). Dimension 2 may be interpreted as indicating a more technical aspect of the differences based on the amount of variance in the variables (i.e., degree of consensus: The top of the scale represents high consensus, the bottom represents low consensus).

For all four groups (religious Arabs, secular Arabs, religious Jews, and secular Jews), the salient identities are more clustered than the less salient identities. For religious Jewish women, family identity and being Jewish are placed close together (with the Israeli identity not far from them), and are in contrast with individual

FIGURE 1
Identities and Sociopolitical Activism of Arab Religious Women: Euclidean Distance Model (Derived Stimulus Configuration)[a]



Dimension 1: Individualism-collectivism continuum.
Dimension 2: Degree of consensus.
[a] Identities are in Italics, measures of Sociopolitical Activism are in regular script.

FIGURE 2
Identities and Sociopolitical Activism of Arab Secular Women: Euclidean Distance Model (Derived Stimulus Configuration)[a]



Dimension 1: Individualism-collectivism continuum.
Dimension 2: Degree of consensus.
[a] Identities are in Italics, measures of Sociopolitical Activism are in regular script.

FIGURE 3
Identities and Sociopolitical Activism of Jewish Religious Women: Euclidean Distance Model (Derived Stimulus Configuration)[a]



Dimension 1: Individualism-collectivism continuum.
Dimension 2: Degree of consensus.
[a] Identities are in Italics, measures of Sociopolitical Activism are in regular script.

FIGURE 4
Identities and Sociopolitical Activism of Jewish Secular Women: Euclidean Distance Model (Derived Stimulus Configuration)[a]



Dimension 1: Individualism-collectivism continuum.
Dimension 2: Degree of consensus.
[a] Identities are in Italics, measures of Sociopolitical Activism are in regular script.

identities (e.g., locality, ethnicity, and political identity) which are spread out and in a different quadrant. For religious Arab women, family identity is associated with the collectivistic Arab and ethnic identities, but for secular Arab women, family identity is dissociated from collective identities, and it is located closer to the Israeli and occupational identity.

The relationships between gender identity and each of the other identities seem to indicate that this identity is related to a different set of identities in each of the four groups. For religious Arab and Jewish women, gender identity is associated, as expected, with religious identity (i.e., being religious or secular) and can, therefore, be said to represent the "traditional gender identity." Gender identity of secular Jewish women is closer to occupational identity. For Arab women, gender identity is closest to and equidistant from the collectivistic identities (being Arab, Palestinian, and ethnicity).

To examine the demographic differences and to determine the sociopolitical meaning of a salient gender identity for these groups, the analysis now turns to examine the demographic characteristics and sociopolitical attitudes associated with salient gender identities of these women (see Tables 2 and 3).

Analysis of variance shows that several of the nationality X religiosity X gender identity interactions are statistically significant. More among the Jewish women with salient gender identities (whether religious or secular) are unmarried than among those with weak gender identities (see Table 2). Among Arab women, the trend is reversed so that those with weak gender identities are more often unmarried. Similar findings are found for education and age. Jewish secular women with salient gender identities are the youngest group and have the highest education; religious Arab women with salient gender identities are the oldest group and have the lowest education. Arab women, but especially secular Arab women with salient gender identities, are the strongest supporters of left-wing policies. Religious Jewish women (regardless of salience of gender identity) are the weakest supporters of these policies. Almost half of the secular Jewish women support these policies.

Some of the differences in measures of activism between these groups of women are also significant: Willingness to participate in political protest is most noticeable among secular Jewish women with salient gender identities, and it is least noticeable among secular Arab women with salient gender identities. Jewish women with salient gender identities and religious Arab women with weak gender identities are the least obedient. In addition, religious women are more strongly attached to their neighborhoods and their country than secular women.

In addition, religious women with salient gender identities—more than secular women with salient gender—identities think that the government should be more

TABLE 2
Analysis of Variance: Demographic Characteristics of Arab/Jewish, Religious/Secular, with Weak/Salient Gender Identity

	Arabs				Jews				Main Effects			Interactions		
	Religious		Secular		Religious		Secular							
Variable	Weak	Salient	Weak	Salient	Weak	Salient	Weak	Salient	Nationaliy	Religious	Gender Identity	Nationaliy by Religious	Nationaliy by Identity	Religious by Identity
Demographic Characteristics														
Education (1=none; 8=academic)	4.40	4.00	4.76	4.31	5.37	5.65	6.03	6.54	62.4[a]	27.8[a]	3.17	---	4.48[b]	---
Age (1=20-24; 5=40-44 9=65+)	4.25	5.56	3.33	4.38	4.63	4.26	4.74	3.31	1.90	1.95	7.44[a]	---	13.3[a]	3.88[b]
Marital status (1=not married; 0= married)	.23	.13	.36	.19	.19	.33	.27	.34	.00	6.12[a]	1.71	---	5.77[b]	---
Family size (continuous 1-9)	5.44	4.38	5.10	5.38	4.46	3.93	3.49	3.72	47.3[a]	28.3[a]	.65	4.84[b]	---	7.29[a]
Employment (1=employed; 0=not employed)	.31	.25	.26	.25	.41	.52	.51	.59	17.4[a]	3.77[a]	2.61	---	---	---
Income Level (1=NIS 750; 9= 6000+)	5.15	4.40	4.73	4.94	4.52	4.28	5.04	4.85	.48	5.19[b]	1.01	---	---	---

TABLE 3

Analysis of Variance: Sociopolitical Attitudes of Arab/Jewish, Religious/Secular, with Weak/Salient Gender Identity

	Arabs				Jews				Main Effects			Interactions		
	Religious		Secular		Religious		Secular							
Variable	Weak	*Salient*	Weak	*Salient*	Weak	*Salient*	Weak	*Salient*	Nationaliy	Religious	Gender Identity	Nationaliy by Religious	Nationaliy by Identity	Religious by Identity
Rebelliousness														
Political protest (1=participate a lot; 4=never participates)	3.73	3.73	3.73	3.94	3.84	3.83	3.80	3.43	.07	2.38	7.37[a]	---	3.80[b]	---
Social obedience (1=always; 4=not always)	2.06	2.00	1.98	1.88	1.78	2.07	1.88	2.05	2.27	.42	4.72[b]	---	5.01[b]	---
Social influence (1=*have a lot*; 4=hardly any)	3.23	3.27	3.26	3.38	2.98	3.28	3.04	3.18	5.21[b]	.21	4.89[b]	---	---	---
Involvement														
Political-economic involvement (range:1.27-5.10)	3.86	3.99	3.79	3.78	3.76	3.82	3.84	3.86	.44	.73	.57	---	---	---
Social involvement (range:1.36-5.42)	3.92	3.71	4.04	3.96	3.51	3.75	3.60	3.70	16.5[a]	1.51	.92	---	---	---
Attachment to neighborhood (1=strongly; 5=not at all)	1.65	1.50	1.64	1.73	2.39	2.87	2.55	2.95	62.8[a]	2.58	10.6[a]	---	---	---
Willingness to emigrate (1=*very willing*; 5=*not at all*)	3.77	4.00	3.76	3.75	3.89	3.80	3.76	3.68	.09	6.45[a]	.68	---	---	---
Perceived Responsibility														
Security Issues (range:1.15-5.74)	4.60	4.69	4.54	4.46	5.02	4.92	4.99	4.89	22.6[a]	.40	1.06	---	---	---
Economic Support (range:1.27-6.36)	5.66	5.68	5.49	5.41	4.74	4.80	4.77	4.33	46.8[a]	.79	2.24	---	---	---
Social Issues (range:1.25-6.23)	4.50	4.24	4.38	4.29	5.06	4.97	4.94	4.58	20.9[a]	3.37	5.06[b]	---	---	---
Political Orientation (*Left-wing =1; else=0*)	.65	.44	.60	.81	.13	.15	.46	.48	56.6[a]	78.9[a]	.24	9.78[a]	---	4.38[b]

[a] $p \leq .01$ [b] $p \leq .05$.

responsible than the citizens for security and economic issues. The reverse was found for social issues: secular women with salient gender identities—more than religious women with salient gender identities—think that the government should be more responsible than the citizens for social issues. These findings seem to indicate that the salient gender identity of secular women is associated with supporting a welfare state and to adopting more liberal economic attitudes. Religious women with salient gender identities seem to support the opposite views: more economic involvement and control of the government and less social intervention. This would decrease outside intervention in their orthodox way of life, and increase the economic support for less advantaged groups in society (e.g., big families, less educated and/or disadvantaged ethnic groups, who live far from the center), among which religious women are a greater proportion than secular women.

Examination of the "cognitive maps" provided by the two-dimensional proximities analysis (Figures 1 to 4) shows that the differences between Jews and Arabs seem to be greater than the differences between secular and religious women. Still, although some similarities are noticeable, each group has a distinct "cognitive map."

For all four groups, willingness to protest and perceived social influence are related to the two measures of involvement and to willingness to emigrate from the country. Thus, those who are more active within the social order (in political parties, economic organizations, varied committees, etc.) feel that they also influence their society more than those who are not involved, and are less willing to leave it or emigrate from it. This also seems to inhibit their willingness to participate in social protest.

Obedience and attachment to neighborhood reflect a different cluster of attitudes related to activism. The two measures appear close to each other in all four "cognitive maps." For religious Jewish women, this cluster is tied to the three most salient identities (family, Jewish, and Israeli). A similar finding can be seen for religious Arab women, though for them, obedience is related more strongly to the collectivistic identities (Arab and Palestinian). Thus, religious women who ranked these identities as their most salient identities also tended to be more obedient and tied to their neighborhoods, which may be interpreted as acceptance of the existing social order. They would also be less willing to participate in sociopolitical activity that endangers or threatens this social order.

For secular Jewish women, obedience and attachment to neighborhood are closer to gender identity, indicating their relatedness. As feminist gender identity implies rejection (or criticism) of the existing patriarchal social order, this finding supports the assumption that these women are more willing to oppose the system

than those with a traditional gender identity. Only for secular Arab women are obedience and attachment to neighborhood placed closer to the measures of sociopolitical activism than to identities, indicating, perhaps, that for them activism is independent from these identities.

Another interesting finding can be seen in the placement of government versus individuals' responsibility for social, economic, and security issues. Religious Arab women (and to a lesser degree secular Arab and religious Jewish women) make a distinction between economic issues and other issues. As the data show (see Table 3), religious women delegate more responsibility to the government in economic issues, but desire less intervention in social matters. For secular Jewish women, the three dimensions of responsibility are clustered, and seem to reflect a weaker consensus regarding the role of the state. These findings may be related to differences in political orientations, but such a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this study.

Conclusions

The gender identities of secular and religious Jewish and Arab women seem to be related to or reflect diverse social orders and are salient among about a quarter of the Arab women, a fifth of the secular Jewish women, and less salient among the religious women in Israel. The analyses seem to support the assumption that social identity has a broader meaning than is usually given to it in sociological theory, which almost always disconnects identities from their role in the formation of social order and social change. Locating the identities within the context of the construction of social orders, the analyses suggest that the hierarchy of identities and the sociopolitical attitudes of religious women indicate a more consensual acceptance of the social order than the hierarchy of identities and the attitudes of secular women. Moreover, for both Jewish and Arab women, gender identity is related to religiosity, and it is dissociated from both the salient identities and the sociopolitical attitudes.

Jewish religious women seem to accept the patriarchal system and are therefore more obedient than secular women who are less likely to accept the patriarchal decrees and are more likely to participate in activities that are designed to change it. The same was not found for Arab women: whether religious or not, a salient gender identity seems to indicate tradition-orientation and acceptance of women's passive role in society. A weak gender identity seems to indicate a moving away from passivity, as if the process of becoming socially active is a two-stage process in which women move away from the traditional gender roles of nurturant wives and care-

takers, and only then can they develop an alternative-feminist-gender identity. Arab women seem to be in the first stage where they are dissociating themselves from salient tradition-oriented gender identities. This is more common among the younger and more highly educated than among older and less educated Arab women.

The hierarchy of identities and the sociopolitical attitudes of religious women represent the national (Jewish/Arab) social order, the hierarchy of identities and the sociopolitical attitudes of secular women seem to represent—though to a lesser extent—the civic (Israeli/Palestinian) social order.[13] The first connotes the religious-primordial aspects of belonging to the land, while the latter connotes its secular-universalistic aspects. Thus, although the ongoing battle between different components of the society over the "preferred order" is closely connected with the preferred collective identities in the two societies, the kulturkampf has not erupted into a chaotic civil war (yet?) and the battle over "order" is still managed within the boundaries of certain accepted rules.

The lower consensus regarding the universalistic civic order can be seen as both strength and weakness; strength because it tolerates a diversity of goals and preferences within its boundaries, the result of which is legitimization of pluralistic representations of the social order, and weakness because in a battle for dominance, the more unified particularistic Jewish social order, with its' more immutable and consensual goals and preferences, may rally its troops more easily. The political reality in Israel (i.e., Israeli society is split regarding the peace process, equality of rights for Arabs, and the Jewish countenance of the state) supports this conclusion. Jews who support the national social order tend to oppose the peace process, define Israel as a Jewish state, and are against equality for Arabs. Jews who support the civic social order tend to support the peace process and define Israel as a democratic state in which equality is a necessary precondition. Although almost all Palestinian citizens of Israel support the peace process and desire a democratic state in which equality is a necessary precondition, those among them who support the national order do not reject the Israeli identity (though that identity was imposed on them by formal Israeli authority as part of the attempts to redefine their loyalties). In contrast, those among them who support the civic order reject the Israeli identity.

For secular women, a salient gender identity limits the commitment to the collective, while for religious women, a salient gender identity is dissociated from collective identities and does not hinder commitment to the collective. As a result, secular women are less obedient to the "rules of the game" than are religious women, and are less willing to accept the existing social order.

The different meanings and interpretations given by different individuals to the same identity, as well as the different content assumed in any culture for the

same identity, does not weaken its importance. Such ambiguities are built into any cultural term. This interpretation also supports feminist notions according to which social placement determines most of the individuals' experiences so that members of the same social category share perspectives of reality. But broad "social categories" may at times be misleading.

As the present analysis shows, women do not form a single well-defined group. The demographic "profiles" of the four groups differ as much as their attitudinal ones. More among the religious women than among secular women are of lower income families, married and with large families. More among them also have lower formal education and fewer among them work. Thus, religious and secular women have very little in common and it seems hard to imagine any cooperation between them based on shared goals. The cultural, linguistic, and political barriers between Jewish and Arab women hinder cooperation between secular Jewish and Arab women even further (religious Jewish and Arab women have weaker interest in cooperating as their political goals are incompatible).

Secular women in Israel (and especially Jewish women), no longer complacent and satisfied with their allotted roles and place in the social order, engage today in social actions to increase social equality and are more willing to fight the social system and its institutions. The willingness to participate in collective social action on gender issues to increase gender equality seems to be related to salient gender identities and their prevalence in a given society, legitimized and directed by relevant—mostly feminist—ideologies. Thus, the dissatisfaction with social systems directs the structuration processes away from reproducing the existing sociocultural systems and toward social change. Religious women (and especially Arab women) are less active in this sphere, but Jewish religious women are just as politically active (especially against the peace process, and in support of the reactionary right-wing coalition).

Social activism (as represented by participating in political protests, less sociopolitical obedience, and perceiving stronger social influence) is strongest among secular Jewish women with salient gender identities and it is weakest among Arab women with salient gender identities (regardless of religiosity). The findings seem to indicate that these Jewish women are becoming a "class for itself" while their Arab counterparts are still at the "class by itself" stage, which is—as yet—less empowered than Jewish women.

The "cost" of using a specific test case seems to be the marginalization of the role of additional identities that may, in other case studies, play a more central role in the structuration of the system, such as religion, ethnicity, or locality. However, despite the relatively restrictive character of the Israeli case, by examining agency

via identities, the study has demonstrated how a large margin of possible choices and combinations of diverse identities is given to agents, which makes possible the constitution of alternative orders. Further studies are necessary in order to examine these differences in societies in which state and religion *are* separated.

Notes

1. The term "traditional" is used in its literal sense (according to Webster's Thesaurus) to denote generally accepted, customary, habitual, widespread, sanctioned, prescribed, doctrinal, and well established cultural norms.

2. Following Eisenstein (1979) Kourany et al. (1992) and Andersen (1993), I define patriarchy as a hierarchical system of social relations among men and women that creates and maintains the domination of women.

3. In contrast, some denominations are more liberal and more egalitarian. However, these denominations are not common in Israel and only Orthodox Judaism is currently formally recognized in Israel. The more egalitarian denominations are strongly influenced by liberal, humanitarian, and feminist movements around them. Among Muslims, the trend seems to be reversed so that all religious Muslims are devote, but the Fundamentalists see themselves as more devote than others (Haddad, 1985). Thus, all Muslims are bound by a powerful cultural and religious ideology linking family honor ("ird") to female virtue, entrusting men with safeguarding family honor through control over female members (Mernissi, 1987; Moghadam, 1992). As one of the Reviewers rightly commented, certain newer Muslim movements like the Hamas and the Hizbollah enforce a more literal interpretation of Islam that problematize gender relations and promote a more traditional division of labor.

4. In order to avoid a lengthy discussion of differences that is not entirely relevant in this context, the concept "feminism" is used for a variety of political perspectives.

5. However, an attitude survey performed by The Strategy Institute (1998) shows that 45 percent of the women in Israel define themselves as "feminists" when everyday practices (rather than ideologies) were examined. (The definition of feminism was deliberately left open to individual interpretations to maximize responses.)

6. This limitation was imposed because compulsory military service in Israel applies to almost all Jewish men between the ages 18–21 and most Jewish women aged 18–20, and the difficulty of locating the very old.

7. Israeli political parties whose voters and representatives all are Arabs and are not represented at all in the Jewish sector.

8. Cultural and structural differences between the two societies preclude identical terms. I use the term "ethnicity" as a general form though only in the Hebrew version of the questionnaire the item was called and specified "Moroccan, Polish, Rumanian," etc. In the questionnaires in Arabic the tern used was "your religion" and the specification was "Muslim, Christian, Druz," etc. Although the terms applied to the two populations are not exactly the same, they are treated in the study as representing the salience of the cultural dimension of ethnicity.

9. Other categorizations were also examined (e.g., 1st and 2nd ranks vs. all the others, or vs. the no-rank of the identity). Because gender identity is not highly prevalent in Israel, these categorizations produced very small groups that were impossible to analyze.

10. Separate factor analyses were performed for Jewish and Arab women. Both the factor structure and the factor loadings were similar for the two samples. Therefore, the factors used in the analyses were combined.

11. Although the term is the same as the term used for one of the components of social identity, the meaning in this variable is different. Whereas the question regarding components asks how important is being religious or secular in relation to other identity components, this question asks the respondent for degree of religiosity. This question was used later in the analysis to distinguish between religious and seculars.

12. Arab women ranked 11 identities and Jewish women ranked 9 identities, a 5th place in the Arab hierarchy is higher than 5th place in the Jewish one.

13. The question of causality is not crucial in this context, as continuous interplay and a dynamic relationship between agent and structure is assumed.

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APPENDIX I
Factor Analysis: Social and Political Involvement

Factor II	Factor I	Communality	SD	Mean	Type of Involvement
0.72	0.05	0.52	1.09	2.71	Apartment house committee
0.74	0.07	0.56	0.97	3.00	PTA
0.59	0.41	0.51	0.67	3.10	Community committee
0.62	0.39	0.54	0.73	3.08	Workers' committee
0.14	0.48	0.25	0.76	2.72	Labor union
0.11	0.64	0.43	0.74	2.94	Synagogue
0.19	0.69	0.52	0.69	2.93	Voluntary organization
0.24	0.67	0.51	0.63	3.02	Economic organization
0.12	0.79	0.63	0.59	3.01	Political movement or group
0.11	0.82	0.68	0.64	2.96	Political party
1.22	3.93				Eigenvalue
12.2	39.3				Percent variance
.69	.80				Cronbach a

APPENDIX II
Factor Analysis—Role of the State

Factor III	Factor II	Factor I	Communality	SD	Mean	Government Involvement
.24	.50	.15	.34	1.21	3.79	Building kindergartens
.45	.23	.11	.68	1.22	4.01	Helping factories
.24	.77	-.04	.65	0.99	3.67	Absorbing new immigrants
.75	.23	.09	.62	1.13	3.76	Aiding settlers (within the 1948 borders)
.87	-.07	-.03	.75	1.31	3.68	Aiding settlers (in occupied territories)
.04	.76	.21	.62	1.07	3.75	Supporting weak social groups
-.05	.46	.61	.60	1.06	4.12	Preventing crime
.04	.07	.84	.72	0.78	4.59	Dealing with terrorists
.17	.07	.84	.73	0.90	4.45	Protecting the state
1.01	1.48	2.81				Eigenvalue
11.1	16.6	31.3				Percent variance
.57	.62	.72				Cronbach a